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 Abstract 
How can we conceptualise the politics of aid and account for the effects of 
internationally-driven poverty reduction policies in the Global South? This Working 
Paper offers a conceptual framework that goes beyond two common assumptions 
in the academic literature and the activist milieu: on the one hand, the idea that 
one-size-fits-all international recommendations and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) are imposed on recipient governments; on the other hand, the idea 
promoted by the World Bank and shared by most donors that PRSPs are efficient 
when ‘owned’ by the recipient government. To do so, the Working Paper takes the 
case of Mali in the 2000s and presents the uses and trajectories of PRSPs in this 
West African country. The Working Paper distances itself from the two notions of 
imposition and ‘ownership’ and takes recipient agency seriously. To investigate the 
politics of aid and poverty reduction in aid-dependent countries, it offers an 
analytical framework which borrows from the notion of ‘appropriation’. It argues 
that the PRSPs in Mali have been successfully appropriated by public actors, i.e. 
political leaders, public servants and civil society representatives. This Working 
Paper shows how, over one decade, the PRSP has shifted from being a ‘World Bank 
thing’, i.e. a mere conditionality to comply with, to being treated by public actors as 
the ‘reference framework’. This has happened through modalities and processes of 
appropriation which differed from the scenario initially envisaged by the World 
Bank but have ensured that the PRSP has become truly Malian, i.e. embedded in 
the country’s socio-political fabric. 
Keywords  
Politics of aid, aid dependency, poverty reduction, ownership, appropriation, crisis, Mali, 
international political economy, development studies, development anthropology, public 
policy and policy tools  
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The Politics of Aid and Poverty Reduction in 
Africa: A Conceptual Proposal and the Case of 
Mali 
 
Isaline Bergamaschi 
1 Introduction 
The ‘post-Washington consensus’ refers to the arguably new international 
development paradigm proposed by the international financial institutions (IFIs) 
after their structural adjustment programmes generated mixed outcomes and 
harsh criticisms from the 1990s1 onwards. It is composed of the principle of 
ownership – understood as commitment to adjustment and reform (Johnson and 
Wasty 1993: 10–11)2 and poverty reduction, a doctrine that considers more 
thoroughly a number of growth factors such as human capital, innovation and 
public goods. Economic restructuring is accompanied by the provision of services 
(basic education and healthcare), social safety nets (Fine, Lapavistas, and Pincus 
2001), good governance (Leys 2005: 120–1)3 and increased participation of civil 
society organisations. These principles have guided public policy in many 
developing countries – especially in aid-dependent sub-Saharan Africa – in the last 
fifteen years, together with the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) adopted 
under the auspices of the United Nations in 2000, which aimed to cut the world’s 
extreme poverty by half by 2015 (Bergamaschi 2011b: 136–7). 
The implementation of the post-Washington consensus in developing countries 
has materialised through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), i.e. pluri-
annual national plans geared towards poverty reduction and, in many cases, the 
achievement of the MDGs. Designing a PRSP became a condition of eligibility for 
the Highly Indebted Poor Country Initiative (HIPC) in 1999 and hence a ‘new 
conditionality’ of aid (Gould 2005).  
As shown in the MDG Report 2014, the ambitious MDGs have not been met in 
sub-Saharan Africa despite massive international mobilisation. This is due to factors 
and shocks related to the international environment and political economy, the 
relevance and limits of the model pursued, and the local conditions for its 
                                                          
 1 See, amongst others, Danaher (1994); Wysham, Arruda, and Cavanagh (1994); Chossudovsky 
(1997). 
 2 It is important to note that there has been a debate within these organisations about the 
actual meaning of ownership. See Boughton and Mourmouras (2002). 
 3 The intention behind the MDGs was to go beyond economic recommendations, as shown by 
Vandemoortele (2011). 
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implementation. To understand the latter aspect, this Working Paper offers an 
analytical framework to study the trajectories, uses and effects of PRSPs in Mali. 
Such a critical assessment is relevant because a post-2015 agenda has been 
adopted4 at the international level and because Mali was long considered a ‘donor 
darling’ until it plunged into a deep, multidimensional crisis in 2012.  
The dominant policy documents and academic literature dealing with the post-
Washington agenda have pointed to its inherent weaknesses or, alternatively, its 
insufficient implementation. Failure has mainly been attributed to the one-size-fits-
all character of PRSPs and/or lack of local ‘ownership’. Contrary to these 
approaches, the Working Paper takes recipient agency seriously. It builds on my 
previous work to argue that the PRSPs in Mali have been ‘reworked locally’ 
(Bergamaschi 2011a and 2011b) and develops a new framework to highlight how it 
was successfully appropriated by public actors, i.e. political leaders, public servants 
and civil society representatives, including in the light of the recent political crisis 
(since 2012). The Working Paper shows how, over the past decade, the PRSP has 
shifted from being a ‘World Bank thing’5, i.e. a mere conditionality to comply with 
for the country to gain access to debt relief, to being treated by public actors in 
Mali as the ‘reference framework’6. This has happened through modalities which 
differed from what the World Bank initially envisaged, but has ensured that the 
PRSP has become truly Malian.   
The Working Paper draws on my doctoral thesis (Bergamaschi 2011a), extensive 
empirical material, which includes six months of fieldwork and participant 
observation carried out as an intern at the PRSP Unit7 in Mali’s capital city Bamako 
in 2007 and 2008, three additional field trips in 2013 and 2014 (two months in 
total), a close analysis of policy documents and about 200 interviews with 
practitioners undertaken in Bamako, Paris, Brussels and Washington D.C. between 
2007 and 2014.  
The first section reviews the existing literature on the politics of aid, the post-
Washington consensus and the effects of PRSPs in aid-dependent countries and 
presents my analytical framework and contribution to the academic debate. In 
order to illustrate the argument, Section 2 exposes the processes of appropriation 
to which the PRSPs were subject in Mali between 2002 and 2015. The conclusion 
outlines some reflections about the past and future of appropriation, aid and 
international intervention in Mali.   
 
                                                          
 4 A national report on the post-2015 development agenda was adopted in Bamako in May 2013. 
See: République du Mali, Ministère de l’Economie, des finances et du budget, cellule 
technique CSLP 2013. 
 5 This phrase was used in several interviews with agents of the Ministry of Economy and 
Finance and the PRSP Unit between 2007 and 2014. 
 6 Technical assistant, PRSP Unit, interview with the author, Bamako, March 2014. 
 7 The Unit is an administrative entity attached to Mali’s Ministry of Economy and Finance and in 
charge of drafting and supervising the PRSP. For a complete description of the Unit, its 
functions, limitations and legitimacy deficit in the institutional apparatus, see Bergamaschi 
(2014). 
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2 The Conceptual Framework: From 'Ownership' to 
Appropriation  
The conceptual framework presented in this Working Paper builds on the premise 
that because they are fuzzy and apparently neutral, development buzzwords and 
objectives like the MDGs are mobilising metaphors that throw a veil over 
ideological differences during negotiations and facilitate consensus in multilateral 
negotiations and arenas such as the UN (Mosse 2005: 230). It also argues that the 
effects of development-related ‘global prescriptions’ (Dezalay and Garth 2002) are 
better observed and understood when they are implemented in developing 
countries, where they take different paths shaped by local configurations of power 
and produce contrasted and eminently political results. This Working Paper 
explains how this takes place in practice and offers a conceptual framework to 
analyse the ‘politics of aid’ (Whitfield 2008) and poverty reduction in sub-Saharan 
African countries.  
Policy and scholarly debates about the post-Washington consensus have so far 
been dominated by two trends. The first, led by heterodox economists, has offered 
a critical assessment of the PRSPs. Inspired by Marxist or dependency theories, 
they underline that the poverty reduction paradigm is exploitative, paternalistic 
and imposed on developing countries through conditionalities and broader 
schemes of the international political economy. According to these economists, 
poverty reduction as a development paradigm is unable to foster growth and 
industrialisation and achieve real socioeconomic development (see Cammack 2004; 
Chang 2006; Taylor 2003: 310; Fine et al. 2001; Saith 2006). By combining neoliberal 
policies with charity, it is irrelevant and even detrimental to the economies and 
societies in the Global South.  
In Mali, similar positions have been adopted by the far-left Parti pour la Solidarité 
Africaine, la Démocratie et l’Indépendance led by Oumar Mariko and a member of 
the global justice movement, Aminata Dramane Traoré (Traoré 1999 and 2014)8. 
Both are major critics of neoliberal policies, of Mali’s dependency on international 
creditors and of the West more broadly. From a different perspective, critical social 
scientist Hamidou Magassa (2008: 11) called poverty reduction a ‘deadlock’, a 
political and intellectual ‘capitulation’ in the long history of development thinking 
and policies, a denial of autochthonous understandings and experiences of poverty 
(and its local solutions) and an ‘insult to Man and God alike’.  
The second approach adopts ‘ownership’ as a trigger for measuring the 
implementation of the post-Washington consensus. Analysts have pointed to the 
‘gap’ between IFI promises of local leadership of the process and their real 
achievements regarding civil society participation and government leadership and 
control of decision-making and the implementation of policies (Raffinot 2010; 
Dante et al. 2005: 16). By taking the notion of ownership as a marker, however, 
they fail to distance themselves from IFI’s ontological assumptions and institutional 
interests as the notion of ‘ownership’ initially comes from IFIs. 
                                                          
 8 A detailed biographical description of Aminata Dramane Traoré is provided by Siméant (2014). 
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Indeed, in the 1980s and 1990s, borrowing governments implemented Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) unevenly, superficially or selectively because their 
policy recommendations and the conditionalities attached to financial relief were 
unrealistic and could generate instability and protest, thus eroding the social 
legitimacy and basis of regimes, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (Williams 2006: 
10). In the context of severe ‘aid fatigue’ in the late 1990s, donors concluded that if 
the financial arm can encourage – or compel – recipient authorities to accept a 
certain number of reforms through conditionalities, it cannot buy adherence and 
guarantee implementation. For example, in a study carried out in 1998 by the 
London-based Overseas Development Institute, Tony Killick (1998: 3) tackled the 
following question: ‘What policy change are we [donors] buying with this money?’, 
and identified two explanatory factors for the failure of SAPs: ‘external shocks’ (the 
international environment, climatic conditions, etc.) and the ‘lack of will’ of 
recipient governments. Building on Derick Brinkerhoff’s analysis, the author 
concludes that the pressure exerted by donors cannot replace ‘local leadership’9. 
As IFIs were called into question and urged to change, the notion of ‘ownership’ 
acted as a ‘legitimacy fix’ for them. It helped reconcile the need to reform IFI 
practices while protecting what the World Bank staff call ‘sound’, ‘good policies’ 
(Woods 2006: 167) and their ‘professional standards of excellence’ (Gulrajani in 
Stone and Wright 2007: 52), driven by the need to facilitate reforms and to take 
into account national specificities while ensuring the universality and neutrality of 
IFI programmes10. 
The term ‘ownership’ initially comes from the fields of law (it means property) 
and management studies, where it refers to a set of values and co-optation 
techniques used to control and motivate employees in firms, increase their 
personal commitment to corporate objectives and enhance their productivity 
(Cooke 2003). The term loses some of its clarity when imported into the field of aid 
(Williams 2006: 10), but is given a specific meaning for IFIs, highlighted in a World 
Bank discussion paper:  
The defining quality of ownership is a country's acceptance without 
coercion of full responsibility for the outcome of a program and 
therefore rationally insisting on acting in self-interest to maximize 
the expected utility of its citizens obtained from the program 
(Johnson 2005: 5).  
                                                          
 9 ‘No amount of external donor pressure or resources, by themselves, can produce sustained 
reform. It takes ownership, both of the policy change to be implemented and of any capacity-
building efforts intended to enhance implementation (…) Without policy “champions” who 
are willing and able to serve as leaders for change, reform is not possible. Fundamentally, 
indigenous leadership is essential for sustainable policy implementation’ (Killick 1998: 90–1).  
 10 ‘Progress in implementation has been stronger, where governments have “owned” the 
program and hence were committed to carrying it through (…) The cost of failure is too great 
(…) to ignore the potential contribution of a better understanding of the political economy of 
adjustment’ (Johnson and Wasty 1993: 10–11).   
Bergamaschi  |  The Politics of Aid and Poverty Reduction in Africa 
 
 
 
Global Cooperation Research Papers 16 9 
 
 
Following an approach inspired by the agency theory11, the goal for IFIs is to 
‘align’ the preferences and interests of recipient governments in developing 
countries to the post-Washington consensus and make them embrace poverty 
reduction objectives, i.e. to make them their own:  
The principal (here, the donor) must rely on the assisted country 
(the agent) to pursue certain objectives; in a context of imperfect 
information and in the absence of an efficient surveillance 
mechanism, the agent has the possibility to follow their own 
interest rather than the principal’s and the principal’s interest is 
that the agent adopts the same objectives as theirs (Guillaumont et 
al. 2004). 
In the process, African governments do not get a free hand to implement their 
preferred policies (Whitfield 2008: 6–7). ‘Ownership’ must express itself within the 
limits of the ‘partnership’ established with donors and despite their massive 
presence and constant interference (‘donorship’ in the words of Mosse and Lewis 
2005: 85 and 105), as illustrated in a report produced by the G24: 
If a program is going to be supported by outsiders – in particular by 
powerful creditors – then the outsiders must be convinced of the 
sustainability of the economic policies before they would give their 
support (Johnson 2005: 8).    
The shift from adjustment to ‘ownership’ has not implied a shift of power from 
Washington D.C. to African capital cities or a reaffirmation of the sovereignty and 
right to auto-determination of governments in the Global South. On the contrary, 
the notion can contribute to fuelling and institutionalising their loss of sovereignty, 
which was aggravated after the end of the Cold War. The sovereignty of African 
states in particular is conditioned to their capacity to ensure economic 
development and the well-being of their populations. The international community 
attributes itself the right to be partially in charge of economic development in 
these countries through numerous and multi-faceted interventions (Fraser 2006). 
Therefore, the challenge for the governments of developing countries is really to 
‘maximise ownership within the constraining contours of conditionalities’ (Kahn 
and Sharma 2003: 235). 
When criticised for imposing one-size-fits-all models and policies and for causing 
breaches of sovereignty in the Global South, IFIs promise that programmes would 
no longer be elaborated in Washington D.C. but in developing countries. The role of 
international donors remains essential, but IFIs claim to shift from a coercive role to 
increasing their influence to make sure that the post-Washington consensus is 
internalised as soon as possible (OED 1986: iv, quoted in Johnson and Wasty 1993: 
1). Political leaders in developing countries are said to be ‘in the driver’s seat’ and 
expected to have or develop the vision, faith and determination needed to engage 
in in-depth reforms of the economy and the state. They must proactively support 
                                                          
 11 For an example of how the agency theory was applied to aid relationships, see Martens 
(2005). 
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and take responsibility for the programmes, from their elaboration to their full 
implementation (Johnson 2005: 2 and 7–8; Khan and Sharma 2003: 235) and 
manage aid resources and relationships with donors in an efficient way12. They 
must also organise and supervise the participation of civil society organisations and 
private stakeholders to avoid opposition and build a consensus that is as large as 
possible in order to guarantee the success and sustainability of programmes 
(Taylor 2003: 465; Johnson 2005: 4–5; Khan and Sharma 2003: 234; Moore 2006: 
467; Stiglitz 1998).  
However, I have shown elsewhere (Bergamaschi 2011a and 2011b) that there is 
no consensus about the correct translation, meaning and implications of the term 
‘ownership’ in aid-recipient countries specifically amongst the development actors 
present in Mali. Most of the expatriate staff of aid agencies are French speakers. 
For the majority of Malian civil servants, their native language is Bambara and their 
working language is French. Speaking English is very uncommon in Mali. Therefore, 
key players only have a partial understanding of concepts generated in English by 
IFIs. In French, ‘ownership’ is literally translated as ‘property right’ (droit de 
propriété) or ‘possession’ (possession), but since being a ‘propriétaire’ of policies 
makes no sense in French, the term was translated as appropriation by the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). This is highly 
ambiguous since appropriation means ‘becoming the owner of something’ or 
‘making something one’s own’ (in the sense of acquisition) as well as ‘making 
something appropriate for one’s use’ in the sense of adaptation (Le Petit Robert 
2011) (Bergamaschi 2011b). 
On the whole, the key players interviewed in Bamako dislike this translation on 
the grounds that ‘it implies that Mali must internalise what comes from outside.’13 
Mali’s Federation of NGOs (Fédération des Collectifs d’ONG — FECONG) suggested 
that ownership should be translated into the more political notion of ‘self-
determination’. When I asked some interviewees how to translate ‘ownership’ in 
Bambara, their answers varied between ‘tigiya tali’, which means ‘to get hold of’, 
and ‘ka ki yèrè tayé’, which means ‘taking something as if it belongs to you’14 
(Bergamaschi 2011a and 2011b). 
The history of ‘ownership’ shows that it is a normative, politically-driven term 
used by IFIs to defend specific visions and interests regarding aid, policy-making 
and development in the Global South. As such, the notion is analytically weak and 
can only be understood through the competing uses and political struggles it 
generates, the effects it produces and its implications for policy-making. It should 
not be used uncritically in academic debates as it does not necessarily capture the 
                                                          
 12 ‘There has to be a shift away from the previous relatively passive mind-set (…) towards active 
leadership in the development of “homegrown” development programs. Developing 
countries (…) have to develop clearer views as to precisely what forms of external support 
they require (…), based on clearly defined national goals and an exhaustive mobilization of 
national capacities and resources’ (Helleiner 2000: 2–3).   
 13 Interview conducted by the author at the French Embassy in Mali, Bamako, November 2007. 
 14 These two proposals were made, respectively, by Hamidou Magassa (PhD in ethno-linguistics 
and a researcher at SERNESP), and a younger economist who was part of the IMF’s 
representation in Bamako. Their understandings of the concept appear to have been 
informed by their age difference and their position within Mali’s aid community. 
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logics, processes and effects of aid recommendations and resources in developing 
countries. This is why this Working Paper calls for the substitution of the notion of 
ownership with an alternative analytical framework and, in particular, the notion of 
‘appropriation’ (Bergamaschi 2011a), not as a French translation for ownership (as 
the OECD uses it), but in the sense defined by the social sciences.  
Appropriation comes from anthropology. The works of Michel de Certeau (1980) 
reveal how consumers appropriate objects, goods and technological tools through 
daily, mundane and tactical arrangements. In anthropology, any development 
project is regarded as a ‘strategic arena’ (Olivier de Sardan 1995: 20–1) and a 
‘battlefield for control’ that each stakeholder tries to master in its own way (Mosse 
2005: 188). Aid ‘beneficiaries’ are never passive and can act differently from 
donors’ expectations. For instance, Malian anthropologist Birama Diakon (2006) has 
shown how new agricultural techniques introduced by French colonisers at the 
Office du Niger in the early twentieth century led to creative practices: for 
example, the cart’s shape and functioning were modified to fit people’s interests, 
logics and constraints (climate, soil, needs, social structure, etc.). This, the author 
argues, is not due to recipient incapacity, conservatism, lack of understanding or 
bad will, nor is it an anomaly, but a normal process through which individual or 
collective actors, intentionally or not, divert development goals and instruments. In 
this Working Paper, appropriation is not applied to delimited development projects 
or technologies (as in the aforementioned anthropological works), but to macro-
policies like the PRSPs.  
In the field of African studies, Richard Banégas (2003) used the phrase ‘successive 
appropriation’ to characterise the trajectories of democratisation in Benin and its 
deviations from the linear process described by prescriptive models of democratic 
transition. Aurélie Latourès (2008) studied the reception and peculiar uses – the 
appropriation – of social causes and public policy tools related to the fight against 
genital mutilation in Mali and Kenya. Importantly, too, ‘appropriation’ was 
identified by Jean-François Bayart (1999) as one modality of Africa’s insertion into 
the world. In his ‘grammar of extraversion’, the author lists six modalities through 
which the continent has entered globalisation and managed dependency 
historically: coercion (use of physical force and violence); ruse and trickery; 
escapism (e.g. migrations); mediation between external powers and local 
authorities; appropriation, i.e. the adoption of practices and customs of the West; 
and finally, rejection, opposition or resistance. This analytical typology, which 
focuses primarily on culture, religion, food, clothing and war, is adopted here and 
applied to macroeconomic policies and the policy recommendations promoted by 
aid and in particular IFIs in Mali through the conditionalities and other 
interventions, such as so-called ‘policy-making’, ‘capacity-building’ or technical 
assistance. My analysis also builds extensively on the political economy works by 
Béatrice Hibou, which deal with the appropriation of aid and state formation in 
North Africa, and seek to analyse not the effects of economic policies and reforms 
on poverty levels per se, but their articulation with, and influence on, domestic 
politics and the reproduction of authoritarian power (Hibou 2004: 5).  
Finally, the appropriation and Malianisation of the World Bank’s 
recommendations are analysed here through the lens of a public policy tool: the 
PRSPs. Following the work by Lascoumes and Le Galès (2004: 13–17), my 
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observations approach the PRSPs as policy instruments, i.e. ‘both a technical and 
social tool’ that carry a specific conception of, and organise the relationships 
between, public institutions and their beneficiaries. They are the tools through 
which power materialises and is exercised concretely. In this case, the PRSPs entail 
and promote a certain conception of ‘ownership’ and poverty reduction and 
structure the relationships between international donors, the government and civil 
society organisations in Mali. In many ways, then, our approach follows Goran 
Hyden’s invitation to consider development partners as ‘part of a political process 
in which the issues of development and politics are closely interwoven’ (Hyden 
2008) and Jeremy Gould and Julia Ojanan’s early analysis of how aid’s globalised 
and ‘depoliticised mode of technocratic governance’ re-moulds the way ‘politics is 
played out’ in developing countries (Gould 2005; Gould and Ojanan 2003: 7).  
By doing so, my conceptual proposal aims to complement the existing literature 
on the politics of aid and the post-Washington consensus in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Some have studied aid, and specifically structural adjustment programmes, as the 
result of a negotiation between actors, sometimes using game theory – at the 
expense of a critical understanding of the stakes at play and their political meaning 
and implications (Mosely et al. 1991). The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for 
Dealing with Donors, edited by Lindsay Whitfield (2008) highlighted the strategies 
adopted by African governments to ‘deal with donors’ and exert as much control as 
possible over the ways aid resources are used. The volume adopts a comparative 
approach to the strategies deployed by African governments and their degree of 
control over policies. It lists the explaining factors for the variation and differences 
observed, including the resources mobilised to gain autonomy vis-à-vis donors 
(vision of development, ideology, domestic support or opposition).  
Despite its important contribution to the debate, I argue that this volume has two 
main limitations. The case studies focus on the objectives and strategies of 
different African governments and distinguish between those which exert ‘strong’, 
‘medium’ or ‘weak’ control over policies (Whitfield 2008: 331). However, in contexts 
of high aid dependency and co-production of public policies between international 
and national actors, this distinction is not fully convincing and operational in 
practice. Most of the time, macroeconomic frameworks, policy measures and 
reforms result from constant interactions between Malian public servants and 
international experts (donor representatives, consultants, technical assistants). 
They are co-produced and ‘digested’ by them in a way which makes it difficult to 
draw a clear line between actors and identify which specific actor initiated any 
given project or programme, policy or reform (Bergamaschi 2011a). Furthermore, 
the distinction between the government on one side and donors on the other is not 
always the most relevant as some ministries and donors (e.g. the IMF and the 
Ministry of Finance) share, and join forces around, common ideas, priorities and 
professional identities.  
On the other hand, the idea of ‘control’ used by contributors in The Politics of Aid 
gives more importance to the phase when public policies are formulated and 
elaborated than to the phase of their implementation. This is limitative, since 
African governments have learnt over the decades to accept and approve 
international recommendations formally and then fail to implement them. Tactics 
and tricks to avoid the costs associated with implementation and the impact of 
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conditionalities are classified as indicators of ‘weak control’ (as compared to 
opposing donor prescriptions and searching for autonomous policy-making) and 
are thus underestimated in the volume. However, some works on domination and 
the art of resistance in other contexts (slavery, forced labour) have shown that 
there is no separation, but rather a continuum, between ‘mere gestures’ and ‘real 
resistance’. Symbolic or material, implicit or not, direct (strikes, marches, riots) or 
indirect (irony, popular cultural products), differentiated forms of protest are part 
of the same dynamic: they complement one another and are mutually reinforcing 
rather than contradictory and exclusive (Scott 1992: 200 and 217). The notion of 
appropriation is interesting to the extent that it focuses on the implementation 
phase and on the deviations, creative uses and unintended effects that it inevitably 
leads to – despite the policy statements and formal commitments produced by 
recipient governments. 
The following section illustrates the argument by explaining how the PRSP as a 
policy tool has been increasingly appropriated by public actors in Mali, and lists 
several of the processes of appropriation that have been at play with the different 
versions of the PRSPs in Mali since 2002.  
3 Processes of Appropriation and the Many Lives of PRSPs in 
Mali 
Mali applied to the HIPC Initiative in 1999 and was declared eligible the following 
year. The first PRSP (2002–2006) was adopted in May 2002, i.e. at the end of Alpha 
Oumar Konaré’s term as President. The second PRSP was adopted for the period 
2007–2011, and a third PRSP (2012–2017) is currently being implemented. 
The agents involved in designing and evaluating the first PRSP often describe it 
as an ‘iterative’ process and emphasise the ‘improvements’ made since 2002 
regarding context analysis and local ownership. Several weaknesses – which are not 
specific to Mali – remain, such as lack of prioritisation, the insufficient link with the 
national budget, and absence of parliamentary control15. However, the PRSP is now 
part of the planning routine and is a central element of national public policy-
making. The notions of ownership or institutionalisation (Gulrajani 2007; for a 
country case study, see the study led by the London-based Overseas Development 
Institute/David Booth 2001) cannot fully account for this and grasp the uses of the 
PRSPs as their promoters assume that the PRSPs’ greater conformity to the World 
Bank project is desirable and/or inevitable.  
Instead, I argue that the PRSP as a policy tool has been appropriated by public 
actors. In 2013, a donor background document noted that the PRSP is a ‘live 
                                                          
 15 According to the international consultant who supported the process of drafting the third-
generation PRSP, the case of Mali stands in contrast to the cases of other countries of the 
region with majority rule, where Parliament is tasked by the president to play a more 
prominent – if not autonomous or critical – role in the strategy’s adoption and monitoring. 
Interview, Paris, 23.11.2012. 
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document’16. Drawing on this metaphor, the following section describes the many 
lives of the PRSPs, which have contributed to its non-linear, uncertain diffusion and 
successive appropriation in Mali. This section shows how the successive versions of 
the document have been increasingly ‘Malianised’ by national public actors: for 
each PRSP, one modality of appropriation is explained in detail: firstly (i) insertion, 
then (ii) adaptation and more recently, (iii) sacralisation.  
It is important to note that the separation between the three versions of the 
PRSP is not as strict as it may seem. The chronological path corresponds to specific 
developments and is emphasised here to facilitate understanding. In the same vein, 
the different modalities of appropriation mentioned below are dominant in a 
certain period of time but are by no means mutually exclusive.  
The First PRSP: Insertion into National Bureaucracy and Politics 
Because it stemmed out of conditionality for access to the HIPC initiative, the 
first PRSP in Mali was, overall, considered as a ‘World Bank thing’ which ought to be 
inserted into the country’s bureaucracy and politics.  
The Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté was elaborated hastily by two 
young economists trained in France under the supervision of a former high-ranking 
official of the Planning Ministry (today’s PRSP Unit coordinator). They worked 
under considerable pressure and to strict deadlines. The two subsequent PRSPs 
(2007–2011 and 2012–2017) were elaborated by the PRSP Unit, an administrative 
entity created to write and monitor the PRSP. Because IFIs were reluctant to locate 
it at the Ministry of Planning, which they associate with socialist planning, the PRSP 
Unit was formally attached to the Ministry of Economics and Finance (Bergamaschi 
2014). However, it was located in a separate building and has enjoyed relative 
autonomy. Since its creation in 2001, the Unit has been supported by donors 
(especially the European Commission) through funds and technical assistance. The 
Unit has not been fully accepted by other ministries, which at times have resisted 
its political will and remit to coordinate all public policies (Bergamaschi 2014). 
The PRSP was politicised from its introduction. Most civil servants welcomed the 
fact that the government had to develop its own national strategy after decades of 
arguably imposed structural adjustment policies and the weakening of planning 
institutions17. At that time, the government already had a poverty reduction plan, 
the Stratégie Nationale de Lutte contre la Pauvreté (SNLP), initiated and supported 
by UNDP. However, the IFIs did not accept this document as a basis for the PRSP, 
arguing that its macroeconomic framework was weak. A dispute ensued between 
Malian authorities, supported by the UNDP, and IFIs, which cast doubt on the World 
Bank’s willingness to hand over decision-making power to the government (Dante 
et al. 2002). Finally, a compromise was reached, whereby the IFIs accepted the 
SNLP as one of the pillars of the PRSP and the tensions dissipated (Bergamaschi 
2011b).   
                                                          
 16 Cellule CSLP/M. Trévoux, ‘Note sur le suivi du CSLP’, Bamako, December 2007. 
 17 Interviews at the Ministry of Economy and Finance, Bamako, 2008, and at the Secretariat for 
Aid Harmonisation, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Bamako, March 2014. 
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When the second PRSP (2006–2011) was drafted, two former ministers were 
asked to contribute. They wanted this document to be entitled ‘A Framework for 
Growth and Reducing Inequalities’, on the grounds that poverty reduction alone 
would not suffice to achieve economic development. However, one of these 
ministers stated in an interview that ‘we were pressured not to rock the boat’. A 
plethora of demands from various key players was taken into consideration by the 
document’s authors, and the PRSP became a long list of consensual policies with 
little priority ranking. In fact, the proposals of the two former ministers aimed to 
politicise the PRSP, which is often viewed by donors as a technical exercise. They 
wanted to produce a differentiated analysis of the country’s potential resources 
(according to the country’s social groups, economic sectors, and regions) and 
translate them into political choices geared towards more egalitarian wealth 
distribution. However, the desire to obtain as much aid as possible and adopt a 
consensual position domestically prevailed. The draft document was amended so 
that its title included a reference to economic growth (croissance), though. 
To understand the initial insertion of the PRSP into Malian politics, it is necessary 
to recall that the authorities’ positioning towards the PRSP in the early 2000s was 
the result of a pragmatic move rather than a declaration of faith in the post-
Washington consensus (Bergamaschi 2011a and 2011b).  
Malian authorities adopted a pragmatic strategy of compliance (Bergamaschi 
2008: 220–1) towards the post-Washington consensus and its main policy 
instrument, the PRSP. This position, which goes beyond ‘ownership’ and resistance, 
marks and reflects an important moment in the evolution of the country’s approach 
to managing aid dependency and its extraversion strategy since independence.  
Unlike the majority of African colonies at the end of French rule, Mali unilaterally 
declared its independence from France on 22 September 1960 (Sidibé 2005: 341) 
and adopted a sovereignty-oriented, pan-African development model and a foreign 
policy inspired by Third Worldism. For example, the country did not join any of the 
various monetary, economic, political and military arrangements established by 
Paris. Mali’s first President, Modibo Keïta, launched a programme of rural socialism. 
Keïta was toppled by a coup in 1968 (Sidibé 2005: 342–4) and replaced by a military 
junta led by increasingly authoritarian Moussa Traoré, which lasted until 1991. Early 
economic difficulties forced Malian leaders to ask for help. 
Aid became embedded in the country’s budget during the first decade after 
independence (Bonnecase 2011). Under the military regime, aid represented 83.3% 
of the programme triennial adopted by the government (Diarrah 1990: 166–8). With 
the devaluation (50%) of the Malian franc imposed by economic indicators in 1967, 
the Treasury was placed under the protection and control of France (Sidibé 2005: 
352–4), which put an end to the first governments’ search for autonomy from the 
former colonial ruler. Mali joined the CFA franc zone in 1984 (Géronimi 2005: 453) 
and signed its first agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1982, 
1983 and 1985.   
Whereas Modibo Keȉta warned against the perils of aid, his successors became 
accustomed to it and actively participated in international fundraising initiatives, 
particularly during the massive drought in the early 1970s (Bonnecase 2011). As the 
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different development policies were failing, aid dependency (Lancaster and 
Wangwe 2002) rose, and external funds were pillaged by the military junta.  
After the mid-1980s, the influence of IFIs grew as a consequence of debt 
restructuring and structural adjustment. This was a major turn, since during the 
first decades after independence, Malian civil servants and development planners 
were trained in Eastern Europe and the USSR and inspired by Soviet-style planning 
(Géronimi 2005: 457). Multilateral donors attached strict economic policy 
conditionalities to aid. Mali became decapitalised to the point that today, ‘any 
significant economic action (…) cannot be carried out without external finance’ (Lê 
Châu 1992: 37–8). In October 2007, in a press interview, the Minister of Finance, 
Abou-Bakar Traoré, said that ‘what is important is to have an economic and financial 
program that will be coherent enough to be accepted and supported by the 
international community’ – as if the development strategy were a tool to achieve aid 
disbursements, rather than the other way around. After 2012 and during the 
occupation of the Northern regions, the Bamako-based government multiplied its 
calls to the UN, France, ECOWAS and even NATO (via the African Union) for 
international support (Bamako.com 2013). This illustrates their openness towards 
international interventions and interference. 
Foreign assistance represented 12% of the national income and 60% of public 
investment in 2009 (République du Mali, Ministère de l’Economie et des 
finances/Secrétariat à l’harmonisation de l’aide 2011: 5). The aid regime, with its 
consultants, per diem payments and projects, is deeply entangled in Mali’s public 
administration and political game. The costs of divorce from the IFIs – which would 
entail not adopting a PRSP and exiting the HIPC process – are deemed too high by 
contemporary elites (Bergamaschi 2011a). Unlike some Latin American countries in 
the 2000s (Ranta-Owusu 2008), the government of Mali has not tried to build an 
alternative development path based on nationalism, ideology or indigenous 
worldviews. 
An anecdote collected during a fieldwork mission in 2008 provides a good 
illustration of this. At a meeting, the PRSP Unit staff were setting up a roadmap to 
prepare the upcoming donor roundtable18. Placed under considerable political 
pressure to secure as much external funding as possible, the Unit’s coordinator was 
trying to motivate his team. As some Unit members were drawing up a list of 
potential personalities to chair the event – the names of Jimmy Carter, Kofi Annan 
or Tony Blair were mentioned – suddenly someone suggested: ‘What about inviting 
Hugo Chávez? ’ Loud laughter and whispers filled the room; and someone added: 
‘Doing this would be the best way for us to get absolutely no cash at this roundtable! 
And Bush would never come back to Mali again!’ This simple joke among colleagues 
is political, too, in the sense that it involves Hugo Chávez, a South American 
socialist leader supportive of ‘anti-imperialist’ and anti-neoliberal cooperation 
mechanisms between like-minded countries of the South. As such, it shows that 
Malian civil servants are fully aware of the possibility to turn to international 
partners other than the IFIs. But they do not envisage it as a serious option and 
merely treat it as a joke (Bergamaschi 2011a: 110). 
                                                          
 18 A roundtable is a formal event whereby a recipient government describes the country’s 
situation and presents its strategies and donors pledge financial support. 
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This implies that, since 2002, successive governments have engaged in a process 
of imperfect and partial implementation of PRSPs and, more importantly, that the 
trajectory of this new public policy tool has constantly changed in order to adapt to 
shifting conditions and to serve the interests of the actors involved.  
The Second PRSP: Adaptation to ATT’s Consensual Mode of Government 
Like its predecessor, the second PRSP was ill-suited to the political cycle, as it 
needed to be adopted before a presidential election (2007) again. This reveals IFIs’ 
lack of understanding of, and respect for, domestic politics: they seem to consider 
that the poverty reduction strategy would be valid despite an announced change of 
incumbent. For the electoral campaign, President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) set 
forth his own ‘Economic and Social Development Plan’ (Programme pour le 
Développement Economique et Social or PDES), which was the only strategy that he 
endorsed and publicly referred to. Its priorities were the improvement of public 
policies, primary production and food security, the private sector, the inclusion of 
women and youth in productive systems, access to social services and regional 
integration. In the donor community, confusion soon emerged about what should 
be considered the national development policy: ‘the PRSP is for donors, the PDES is 
for Malians’, said one staff member of the European Commission delegation in 
Bamako in 2008.  
At first glance, it looks as if the PRSP was not accepted by the President, that it 
had been duplicated, bypassed by the PDES and poorly embedded in the national 
fabric. Nevertheless, two arguments contradict this view. On the one hand, the 
PDES is not an alternative to the PRSP, since it borrows heavily from it. A civil 
servant believes that it was copied almost directly from it. In their efforts to 
placate donors, civil servants explained that the PDES actually borrowed from and 
converged with the PRSP19. In fact, a careful analysis of the document reveals that 
the PDES is an adapted, simplified version of the PRSP, an instrument ATT deemed 
technocratic and oriented towards external actors.  
As shown in Table 1 (in Annex), though, the differences between the second PRSP 
and the President’s PDES are not fundamental or structural. The presidential 
strategy, for example, puts more emphasis on young people (who are a major 
source of political opposition and resistance in the country). In other words, 
President Touré refused to run the presidential campaign with the PRSP, but was 
unable or unwilling to come up with an alternative strategy to the one supported 
by IFIs. Donors, not fully convinced by this argument, asked ministries and the PRSP 
Unit to clarify the status of the PDES but, in the midst of confusion, continued to 
work with and finance the PRSP. 
On the other hand, when ATT (who, according to the Constitution, could not run 
for a third term) created a political party to carry on his legacy as an independent 
President in 2011, he called it the Programme pour le Développement Economique et 
Social (PDES), thus using the same title. This showed that the PRSP has been 
digested and fully integrated into domestic political processes through an 
                                                          
 19 Observations during meetings held at the PRSP Unit, Bamako, 2008. 
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amended presidential version20. Indeed, it has been disseminated through the 
programmes and campaigns of all presidential candidates, and poverty reduction is 
the only acceptable and conceivable development paradigm in the country today21. 
Since 2002, the PRSPs have also been subject to constant adaptation as the 
government has been eager and careful to combine it with many of its priorities, 
which only partly coincide with poverty reduction per se. These include ensuring the 
monopoly of the state across Mali’s territory, containing social protests and 
fuelling clientelistic networks. To that effect, poverty reduction has been used 
loosely and twisted. Three governmental initiatives are good illustrations of this.  
In the field of food security, the President selected from the various dimensions 
and objectives of poverty reduction and manoeuvred at the margins of the PRSP so 
as to promote his visions and interests (Bergamaschi 2011: 130–2). When 
international food prices rose dramatically and peaked in 2005, the President made 
food security a national priority, reflecting the fact that in Mali, the memory of the 
famine of the 1970s is strong. The Secretariat for Food Security, formerly attached 
to the Ministry of Agriculture, was assigned to the Presidency and national 
resources were mobilised to finance the National Security Stock of cereals. Cereal 
banks were created and free distribution schemes were put in place (Arditi 2009). 
In 2008, the President decided to boost and subsidise the production of rice and 
launched the rice initiative. ATT argued that the measure responded to an 
emergency and respected the poverty reduction objective edicted in the PRSP. 
However, he did so in a more political manner, through individual, proactive 
strategies. To that extent, he built on a long tradition of state regulation and direct 
intervention by the sovereign chiefs (emperors, princes or heads of state) 
operating since the Middle Ages in West Africa (Arditi 2009).   
Donors did not welcome it, seeing it as a political move incompatible with 
existing frameworks (the PRSP and the rural development strategy) and the 
budget. The ‘rice initiative’ and subsidies also contradict the principle of market-
driven cereal production, volumes and prices, and, overall, the liberalisation of the 
cereal trade which started in the 1980s and 1990s under pressure from the IFIs. 
More importantly, the initiative was not geared towards the poorest strata of 
society. Indeed, in the countryside, Malians mostly eat locally grown cereals such as 
millet, sorghum and corn (Roy 2010a). Therefore, by giving priority to rice, the 
initiative clearly targeted urban populations and amounted to an attempt to buy 
social peace in the capital city, Bamako, at a time when urban protests were on the 
rise in other developing countries (Egypt, Cameroon, etc.) as a result of a dramatic 
increase in global food prices. The poverty reduction agenda was hence adjusted to 
fit some of the President’s interests and priorities, which at the time also included 
running for a second presidential term. The initiative further served to consolidate 
the position of elites in the capital (civil servants, businessmen, rich peasants, NGO 
leaders), who were able to capture subsidies and invest in rural land (Roy 2010a: 
100). 
                                                          
 20 I thank Johanna Siméant for suggesting this phrase to me. 
 21 Interview, Prime Minister’s Office, Bamako, 22/03/2013. 
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In the same vein, the presidential social housing programme launched in Bamako 
in 2004 was redirected to form or maintain a clientele. Originally targeting former 
soldiers and the poor, in practice it benefited military officers, high-ranking civil 
servants and businessmen (Le Caiman de Inde 2009; Bamanet 2009; L'indicateur 
Renouveau 2009; Zakaryaou 2007). Critics in the press called the areas where social 
housing was built ‘ATT-bougou’ – ‘ATT’s neighbourhood’ in Bambara, the local 
language. 
The PRSPs lay – and must be understood – at the juncture between international 
standards and domestic politics, which after 2002 were characterised by 
‘consensus’, a political system set up by ATT and in which the PRSP was totally 
assimilated. ‘Consensus’, as a mode of government, emerged from the peculiar 
circumstances in which President Touré was elected and characterised his two 
mandates until the coup which eventually toppled him (2002–2012). In 2001, the 
Alliance pour la Démocratie au Mali (ADEMA) – the party in power since the 
democratic transition of the early 1990s – struggled to find a candidate. ATT, a 
former general known as the ‘soldier of democracy’ for his key role in the fall of 
military dictator Moussa Traoré in 1991 and his retreat from the political game 
thereafter, ran as an ‘independent’ representative of civil society and was elected 
President despite rumours of fraud (Chauzal 2005: 52). But as he had run as an 
independent candidate coming from civil society, he was deprived of the support of 
a political party, and, as a subsequent election revealed, of a majority in Parliament. 
For this reason, after his election he pulled together a broad coalition of all parties 
and civil society representatives. ATT’s promise of unity was accepted by all actors 
because it met all of their needs: political parties felt protected from the risk of 
exclusion by being part of the group holding power, and ADEMA bought itself 
some time to better prepare for the next presidential election (Baudais and 
Chauzal 2006: 70).  
Embassies and aid agencies initially thought that consensus could trigger the 
leadership and stability deemed necessary to carry out reforms. In other words, 
they hoped that domestic consensus would facilitate consensus with donors, foster 
national unity and government leadership and reduce the weight of opposition 
(Chauzal 2005: 82–3, 94; Chauzal 2011)22. But this assumption was based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the underpinnings of ATT´s rule in practice 
throughout the years (2002–2012).  
In fact, the political system encouraged a ‘weak consensus’23 with donors, but it 
did not produce the expected ‘ownership’, ‘leadership’ or political will (Diawara 
2012; Bergamaschi 2014: 357). Indeed, the coalition around ATT was not based on a 
shared vision or programme of development but on a fragile compromise between 
contradictory political forces. It was built on an ethos of conciliation and balance 
aimed at sharing power, not on an ethos of reform, i.e. a will or a project to 
                                                          
 22 For example, in 2003 the United Nations Development Programme hoped that consensus 
would help to end social turmoil (‘accalmie sociale’ in French) (PNUD 2003).  
 23 This phrase (‘consensus mou’ in French) was used by candidate Soumaïla Cissé when he 
acknowledged his own defeat and the victory of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta in the presidential 
election in 2013 (France 4 2013). 
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modernise the country24. Malian elites adopted an intermediate posture that 
consisted of neither ownership nor rejection of the IFI-sponsored poverty 
reduction agenda.  
Consensus required permanent internal negotiations and a constant 
redistribution of positions and resources (Baudais 2006: 588). External aid was 
indispensable for its survival, but the government proved unable or unwilling to 
pursue the key donor-promoted reforms and prescriptions. The latter were 
systematically subject to appropriation and adaptation instead of full, compliant 
implementation. The privatisation of the national cotton company, announced as 
early as 1998, was never implemented and was substantially adjusted to the 
government’s concerns and demands25. On this front and many others, donor 
representatives were increasingly disappointed by ATT’s rule. 
The third PRSP: Sacralisation   
The preparation of the third PRSP marked its sacralisation. I use this word 
because it was used by one of my interviewees at the PRSP Unit in 2014, in 
reference to two phenomena: (i) the fact that public administrations have tried to 
associate regional authorities and social movements with the PRSP, thus 
attempting to make it the prominent, uncontested and overarching umbrella for 
public policies; (ii) the fact that a group of civil servants have raised it to the status 
of ‘reference document’ in the midst of increasing political tensions and instability 
after 2012.    
With the prospect of a third PRSP, civil society organisations, in particular trade 
unions, were eager and invited to ‘make the PRSP their own’. Civil society 
organisations generally experience ‘participation’ as a farce, i.e. a hasty, superficial 
exercise, supervised by donors and the government, that does not truly empower 
NGOs and social movements or enhance their real influence on the content of 
public policies and priorities. Social actors also lament that their participation in 
PRSP-related meetings has little impact on the document’s key recommendations, 
and that the PRSPs have so far done little to reduce poverty and foster 
employment (Traoré 2012: 15). 
The Confédération syndicale des travailleurs du Mali (CSTM), a platform of trade 
unions, wrote a formal letter to ask the government to include them more fully in 
the process. In parallel, Malian trade unions joined forces with, and gained support 
from, the German Friedrich Ebert Foundation to draft and promote an alternative 
‘trade union strategy for growth and poverty reduction’, which was released in 
November 2012.  
The confederation was willing ‘to get tools of action and dialogue of [their] own’ 
to influence policy-making and ‘gain visibility’ (Traoré 2012: 49). The trade unions’ 
strategy reversed the order of priorities included in the governmental PRSP for 
                                                          
 24 This argument was elaborated on the basis of an interview with a technical advisor to the 
Minister of Economy and Finance, Bamako, 02/03/2007. Researchers present the same 
analysis (Baudais and Chauzal 2006; Roy 2010). 
 25 On the complex process of cotton sector reform in Mali, see Serra (2014) and Roy (2010). 
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2012–2017: as a result, ‘governance and institutional development’ come first, 
before ‘accelerated, redistributive and sustainable growth’ and ‘the development 
of, and access to, equitable, high-quality basic social services’. A fourth axis 
regarding labour and workers’ rights was added, as well as references to job 
creation and ‘decent work’ in the formal and informal sectors.  
The document’s objectives and method were framed ambiguously as both a 
‘counter-proposition’ and a ‘complement’ to the PRSP (2012: 11 and 50). The 
alternative strategy includes an interesting but somewhat incoherent mix of 
references to the OECD’s Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, harmonisation, 
the macroeconomic convergence criteria of the Economic Community of West 
African States, Marxism, ‘workers’ education’ and the global justice agenda (Traoré 
2012: 33, 42, and 46). It blames the IFIs for imposing policies on governments and 
highlights the virtue of state-led national development planning and social 
development (Traoré 2012: 13). Some aspects of the political context explain why: 
the CSTM was critical of ATT’s policies, as opposed to the Union Nationale des 
Travailleurs du Mali (UNTM), which was closer to the regime and played a prominent 
role in distinct national representation bodies (Roy 2013). However, the CSTM’s ‘in-
and-out’ positioning in the face of the PRSP reflects trade unions’ most common 
strategies in the 2000s. In a political context of consensus, direct opposition based 
on ideological grounds was not the norm, while co-optation of both parties and 
social organisations was rife (Roy 2010b). 
The unions’ initiative looked like a call for inclusion addressed to the government 
rather than a rejection of the ‘World Bank thing’. Despite its reluctance to support 
the government and ‘opposition to any PRSP-related initiative’, the confederation 
eventually chose to be a part of it. Unions admittedly adopted a ‘constructive’ 
approach of ‘partnership’, on the grounds that the PRSP provides the framework 
for all public policies and that ‘getting angry’ would lead them to exclusion and 
powerlessness. It lists a set of ‘counter-propositions to influence the 
implementation of the third PRSP’ (Traoré 2012: 11 and 37); but somewhat 
paradoxically, the document’s format is very similar to the PRSP: it suggests 
identifying ‘best practices’ and setting up a technocratic monitoring committee, 
and proposes an accompanying list of follow-up indicators (Traoré 2012: 64).  
Representatives of the PRSP Unit attended the unions’ strategy validation 
workshop and publicly valued the work done; the document was presented at a 
meeting chaired by the Ministry of Public Administration. During the meeting, the 
CSTM asked to benefit from capacity-building initiatives and a specific budget line 
geared towards trade unions. Some donor representatives promised to support 
them in the future. In April 2014, one CSTM representative was looking forward to 
taking part in upcoming PRSP follow-up exercises26. In the end, it seems that the 
trade union was successfully co-opted around the PRSP by the government and 
bought into the PRSP.  
In 2011, the PRSP Unit went one step further and attempted to ‘regionalise’ the 
PRSP, i.e. diffuse it from the Bamako-based central administration to the country’s 
regions. The initiative materialised through regional consultations throughout the 
                                                          
 26 Interview, Bamako, 03/04/2014, and Traoré (2012: 38). 
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country during the spring of 2011. These took the form of one-day workshops with 
representatives of regional and local administrations, elected and religious leaders 
and, to a lesser extent, civil society organisations.  
The priorities identified at the regional level (see Table 2 in Annex) were not fully 
incorporated into the PRSP. Neither was the PRSP translated into regional 
operational schemes. According to them, strict deadlines for adopting the PRSP 
were an impediment. Additionally, local priorities could only be taken into account 
provided that they were compatible with national planning tools and strategies and 
with international objectives (the MDGs, donor priorities)27.  
However, the consultative process helped to diffuse the national strategy beyond 
the Bamako-based central administrations. The Unit collected reliable and updated 
information (mostly statistics) about needs and ongoing actions at the local level. 
Its staff had the opportunity to distance themselves from their desk-based work, to 
hear the aspirations of citizens in the country’s different regions and to realise that 
‘they know what they want’ – as one Unit agent who participated in the regional 
field mission put it. In the end, the process appears as an attempt at regional buy-in 
rather than a true ‘regionalisation’ of the PRSP’s philosophy and priorities. 
Alongside the wide association – or co-optation – described above, another 
dynamic of appropriation of the third PRSP took place. Before its adoption, the 
third PRSP was adjusted in order to be able to resist increasing tensions and meet 
the government’s increasingly prominent security imperatives. After its adoption, 
when the political crisis culminated, the PRSP was ‘sacralised’ as a safeguard 
against political instability and chaotic policy-making. 
In 2011, Malian authorities lobbied to include the issue of (in)security in the third-
generation PRSP (2012–2017) as a reaction to rising tensions stemming from an 
ancient conflict with Tuareg armed groups in the North (Bøås 2012). When the third 
PRSP was drafted, tensions and fighting between the army and insurgent groups 
were intensifying. At the government’s request, the PRSP Unit insisted that the 
strategy include some ‘preconditions’ related to ‘the consolidation of peace and 
stability’, on the grounds that there cannot be growth and development without 
minimal security. Funds were not specifically allocated to concrete actions and 
security issues, even though the government received technical and military 
support via the US-led Pan-Sahel Initiative and the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism 
Partnership after 2005, which leaders in Washington D.C. justified in the name of 
poverty reduction and development28.  
The establishment of the precondition of peace and security represented a major 
departure from the IFIs’ model of PRSP, which is normally circumscribed to poverty 
reduction sensu stricto so as to avoid the PRSP and aid resources becoming 
enmeshed in conflict dynamics and violence. If bilateral donors had long taken 
security risks into account when designing their partnership with Mali in past years, 
sometimes at the risk of securitising aid and poverty reduction in the country, IFIs 
                                                          
 27 Interview, Social Development Department, PRSP Unit, Ministry of Economy and Finance, 
Bamako, June 2013. 
 28 US representatives in Mali, interviews with the author, Bamako, 2007 and 2008. See also 
Globalsecurity.org, Bayart (2010) and Gutelius (2007). 
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are often reluctant to include the highly political issues of conflict and security in 
PRSPs, as doing so would impede the supposedly apolitical nature of their mission 
and imply that, by virtue of the principles of ownership and alignment, bilateral and 
multilateral aid agencies could virtually be compelled to fund the army’s military 
operations against armed groups or a reform of the security sector. This is hence an 
important element of the Malianisation of the PRSP. 
In 2011, the third-generation PRSP was elaborated while a presidential election 
was scheduled for April 2012. The PRSP Unit had envisioned sharing it with civil 
society organisations, political parties and presidential candidates. The Unit 
coordinator informally met some of the candidates from the major political parties 
so as to give the document a higher political profile. If this was achieved, the 
expectation was that the Unit would later be able to better coordinate all 
ministries around it. More importantly, the Unit wanted to avoid the duplication of 
strategies and politicisation that had occurred with the PDES under ATT: the newly 
elected President could adjust the PRSP but, the Unit hoped, not come up with an 
entirely new document ‘falling from the skies’29.  
Their efforts were interrupted when the political crisis hit, culminating in a coup 
d’état in March 2012 and the subsequent conquest and occupation of the Northern 
regions by Tuareg and, increasingly, Islamist armed groups30. Over the course of a 
couple of weeks in April 2012, the state lost control over two-thirds of the 
territory. Most state representatives, teachers, nurses and doctors based in the 
North fled the violence. The actions and policies included in the PRSP (for instance, 
the construction or renovation of roads) were impossible to implement31. Most aid 
funds were suspended. Scarce state resources were used to pay for salaries and 
fund basic operations at the expense of investments.  
The institutionalisation and future of the PRSP were once more uncertain. 
However, these events and temporary military rule did not marginalise the PRSP; 
rather, they revealed how central to bureaucratic politics it had become as agents 
in the Ministry of Finance and the PRSP Unit (Malians and European technical 
assistants) attempted to ‘sacralise’ the recently adopted PRSP. In the face of 
political instability, they wished to elevate it to the status of ‘reference framework’ 
(‘document de référence’ in French).  
Their initiative was symbolic and political. They argued that ‘in a period of 
instability, we need to hold to stable reference points (…) and institutionalised 
rituals. The PRSP is one of them in the economic realm’. The third PRSP should 
provide a ‘stable reference in the midst of turmoil (…), the logical framework to 
lead the transition’. Burying the PRSP would mean ‘denying the continuity of the 
state and giving credit to those who question it’ and to the military led by Captain 
Sanogo, who justified the March 2012 coup on account of the state’s weakness32. 
The PRSP was one of the tools used by technocrats to protect the country against 
what they considered the risk of erratic spending by the military junta. It was then 
                                                          
 29 Technical assistant, interview, Bamako, September 2013. 
 30 For a summary of events, see Bergamaschi (2013).  
 31 Interview, PRSP Unit, Bamako, March 2014. 
 32 Previous quotes come from an interview with a technical assistant attached to the PRSP Unit, 
Bamako, September 2013.  
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used as a safeguard against erratic international support and reaction to Mali’s 
crisis.   
In preparation for the donor conference for Mali’s recovery held in Brussels on 15 
May 2013, some agencies, such as the UNDP and the World Bank, were eager to 
sideline the PRSP and urged the government to produce a new document – a Plan 
d’actions prioritaires d’urgence (or PAPU). The new strategy would be adjusted to 
the crisis context, seen as more ‘political’ by diplomats and donor headquarters, 
better articulated with the roadmap for the transition adopted by the government 
in January 2013 (in particular, concerning actions to strengthen the Malian army 
and deal with refugees), more limited in scope (only relevant for 2013–2014) and 
hence easier to monitor. But in the midst of crisis, public administrations tried 
again to protect the PRSP, i.e. to ensure that medium-term planning – embedded in 
the PRSP − would prevail over political instability and that the PRSP would not be 
replaced or sidelined by crisis-related temporary public policies or emergency 
action plans. 
The PRSP Unit, the Ministry of Finance and the authors of the Plan for the 
Sustainable Recovery of Mali 2013–2014 (PRED) reached a compromise and stated 
that the PRED was an amended version, or a ‘special modality of the PRSP’33. Some 
elements of the roadmap for the transition were added to the third PRSP and the 
document was translated into English. The PRSP Unit lobbied and convinced donors 
and the government that the diagnosis produced in 2011 had not been 
fundamentally challenged. The situation called for specific, urgent measures, but 
they argued that ‘Malian authorities must articulate them with ongoing projects 
and programmes and national resources’34. The government received support from 
France and the European Commission’s delegation in Bamako and the PRSP was 
recognised as the ‘reference document’ by the actors involved.  
After the presidential election held in 2013, the new government led by 
President Ibrahim Boubakar Keïta presented a Governmental Action Plan (Plan 
d’Action Gouvernemental or PAG) to overcome the crisis and restore order and 
stability in the country. As with the PDES some years earlier, the PRSP was 
challenged by a competing, more political strategy. The PRSP Unit and its technical 
assistants engaged in another lobbying initiative to protect the document against 
political interference. For instance, in March 2014, they organised a seminar about 
the links between the PRSP, the PRED and the PAG. They clarified the overall 
scheme of public policies, arguing that a document endorsed by the Prime Minister 
could not claim to be a ‘reference document’ because of the possibility of 
government reshuffles. Moreover, they claimed that the PRSP was the contract on 
which international donors had committed to aid Mali prior to the crisis. They also 
put forward that the PRSP was the only document able to build a bridge between 
the national budget and public finances, and that its follow-up indicators had been 
used by hundreds of civil servants in the ministries and the technical services for 
many years.  
In other words, public servants have recently come to regard the PRSP as a 
guarantee of bureaucratic continuity and rigour against political interference and 
                                                          
 33 Interview with a technical assistant, Bamako, September 2013. 
 34 Interview with a technical assistant, Bamako, September 2013. 
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fuzziness in a highly volatile environment, and as a safeguard against political 
turmoil. Accordingly, the PRSP survived the crisis and is seemingly being 
implemented through its imperfect but normal channels and procedures.  
Concluding remarks: the past and future of aid, international 
intervention and appropriation in Mali 
This Working Paper has shown that the diffusion of the poverty reduction agenda 
in the past fifteen years in Mali has proceeded through processes of adaptation 
rather than through donor imposition or government ‘ownership’. Since their 
introduction in Mali in 2002, the three PRSPs have been appropriated and used 
strategically for different purposes and in various ways by public actors, 
governmental or not. This, it is argued, has contributed to ‘Malianising’ the PRSPs, 
i.e. to embedding them in the country’s socio-political fabric and adapting them to 
the national needs and context.  
I suggest abandoning the normative notion of ‘ownership’ in studies of the 
politics and effects of aid in sub-Saharan Africa and substituting the notion of 
appropriation, which instead paves the way for a multidisciplinary approach 
sensitive to the power dynamics and recipient agency in the face of aid’s global 
prescriptions. This suggestion extends beyond the aid debate, as ‘ownership’ has 
further been promoted by actors and institutions in the field of post-conflict 
intervention and used as an analytical tool by scholars in the peacebuilding debate 
as well (Donais 2009; Wilén 2014; Franke and Esmenjaud 2008: 137–58; Lemay-
Hébert 2011). 
The article also argues that the specificity of the PRSPs’ implementation in Mali is 
closely related to the country’s past extraversion strategies and to the workings of 
its political system in the early 2000s. These factors were crucial for shaping the 
government’s strategy of compliance towards donors. In this context, recipient 
agency did not consist of a rejection of, or resistance to, the post-Washington 
consensus, but rather of its successive adaptation and appropriation by politicians 
and technicians alike. As a result, the PRSP has become a superposition of layers 
that have accumulated through political consensus and crisis. The strategy has 
competed with, and influenced, other governmental strategies, documents and 
action plans. 
Through their specific trajectory, the PRSPs in Mali clearly distanced themselves 
from the ideal scenario envisaged by IFIs (Bergamaschi 2011a). This means that the 
hegemonic and monolithic project of global governance channelled through aid is 
constantly being reworked and re-negotiated at the local level. At the same time, 
this policy tool, once considered as a ‘World Bank thing’, has become a normal and 
central pattern of public policy. The PRSP has been used for political purposes by 
public actors, who regard it as a ‘reference document’, not because of its content, 
but because it can be instrumental to their multiple political strategies, 
developmental or not. The processes of adaptation and appropriation described in 
the article have made the PRSPs truly Malian, i.e. tailored to the needs of the 
political environment and events.  
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As such, the PRSPs have been fully incorporated into national politics and Mali’s 
‘international State’ (Slaughter in Dezalay 2002: 313), whose public policies, policy 
orientations and tools are permanently influenced and penetrated by donors. The 
PRSPs’ vagueness, adaptability and lack of prioritisation paradoxically contribute to 
their diffusion rather than their rejection or failure. By scaling up these findings, I 
argue that the often-criticised one-size-fits-all character of aid policy tools, 
combined with their vagueness, do not lead to their rejection or failure. On the 
contrary, it allows for their appropriation by distinct actors and facilitates their 
embedding in different contexts. What is at stake, then, is to identify the factors 
affecting the strategies and tactics, the processes and consequences of this 
appropriation, which are always time- and context-specific.   
Because development buzzwords seal agreements around loose commitments 
such as ownership or poverty reduction, they can be taken up and manipulated by 
recipients. The limits, deviations and bypassing practices observed in policy 
implementation make donor products acceptable and useful to different actors, 
thus sustaining their relevance in the distinct political and institutional settings of 
recipient countries. This means that ambiguity, flexibility and malleability 
contribute to the diffusion of aid’s recommendations and to their success as much 
as – or even instead of – their failure35. Success is not understood here as the 
achievement of development objectives or otherwise, but rather as their 
progressive and wide diffusion in many poor but different countries through their 
appropriation by aid recipients.  
The future uses and effects of the PRSP (the third-generation PRSP which covers 
the period 2012–2017) are once again uncertain. International intervention in the 
country has considerably extended its scope and is transforming rapidly under the 
influence of humanitarian actors, the pursuit of military and security objectives 
(with Serval and Barkhane, two successive French military operations) and 
peacebuilding activities with the launch of a UN Multidimensional Integrated 
Stabilization Mission (Minusma) on 1 July 2013. While Mali’s political crisis has 
triggered a crisis of the aid regime, the modus operandi and purposes of 
international processes of involvement in Mali have shifted from development 
assistance for poverty reduction and aid efficiency towards a superimposition of 
rationales and a more complex environment. Fieldwork carried out in Bamako in 
2014 revealed that there is intense competition between development, security 
and humanitarian actors and an emerging division of labour in their interventions, 
as well as occasional hybridisation of their practices. This leads to a proliferation of 
actions and organisations and also to fragmentation of the international 
intervention of Mali. The PRSP was ‘sacralised’ as the reference document and 
considered a guarantee for the stability, continuity and quality of public policies 
after the 2012 coup. I hypothesise that, thanks to the instrument’s adaptability and 
due to its appropriation by different actors, the status of the PRSP III will evolve, 
and that the document will once again be adapted to the country’s new 
circumstances. As a consequence, it is unlikely to disappear or lose its relevance. 
                                                          
 35 Here, I draw on Jacqueline Best’s point about the role of ambiguity and lack of transparency 
in the survival, adaptation and resulting success of Bretton Woods institutions since the 
Second World War (Best 2005).  
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Table 1: Priorities defined in the main poverty reduction 
strategies in Mali, including the three PRSPs and the 
Programme de Développement Economique et Social (1998-2017) 
Document’s 
name & duration 
Origin & status Priorities & objectives 
Stratégie Nationale 
de Lutte contre la 
Pauvreté (1998–
2002) 
Malian government 
with UNDP support 
Presented at the 
roundtable with 
donors held in 
Geneva in 1998 
• Improve the legal, social, economic and cultural 
environment 
• Promote job-creating activities and self-employment 
• Enhance the poor’s access to financial services and 
production factors, education and training, basic health, 
water and sanitation, and habitat 
• Improve performance of agriculture and food production  
PRSP I (2002–2006) 
Cadre Stratégique 
de Lutte contre la 
Pauvreté 
Government of 
Mali, IFI 
conditionality and 
approval 
• Economic development and growth 
• Human and social development 
• Good governance 
PRSP II (2007–2011) 
Cadre Stratégique 
de Croissance et de 
Réduction de la 
Pauvreté 
 
Idem • Strategic focus: productive sector development, public 
sector reform, consolidation of the social sector 
• Priority axis of action: food security and rural development, 
development of small and medium enterprises, the 
environment and natural resource management, public 
administration reform, reform of the business 
environment, development of the financial sector and of 
infrastructures, promotion of democratic governance, civil 
liberties and civil society, consolidation of regional 
integration and African unity, creation of sustainable jobs, 
improving access to basic social services, fight against 
HIV/AIDS, integration into the multilateral trade system 
• Strategy for accelerated growth 
Programme pour le 
Développement 
Economique et 
Social (PDES) 
(2007–2012)  
President ATT’s 
political 
programme during 
the 2007 election 
campaign  
• Renewal of public action
• Primary production and food security 
• Development of the private sector 
• Integration of women and youth in productive channels 
• Social sectors 
• Reforms of social practices 
Rice Initiative, 2008 President ATT Food security
PRSP III (2012-2017) 
Cadre Stratégique 
de Croissance et de 
Réduction de la 
Pauvreté 
Government of 
Mali, IFI 
conditionality and 
approval 
• General objective: ‘An emerging Mali, a better quality of life 
for all’ 
• Two preconditions: strengthening peace and stability and 
the macroeconomic framework 
• Strategic axis of action: accelerated growth, social services, 
institutional development and governance 
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Table 2: Summary of the main priorities identified during the 
regional consultations for the PRSP III, by region (2011) 
Bamako Kidal Sikasso Kayes  
• Reduce negative 
health impacts, 
manage anarchic 
urbanisation, 
improve housing 
and transport 
• Deal with land 
issues, increase 
access to non-
polluted water 
and waste 
management 
•  Reduce incivility 
and the 
degradation of 
values, improve 
road safety, 
boost citizen 
trust in security 
forces 
 
• Improve access by 
upgrading the road 
network and aviation 
services throughout the 
region 
•  Improve the resources 
of local communities, 
develop oasis 
agriculture, improve 
fossil water 
exploitation, facilitate 
girls’ access to schools, 
create a university 
•  Incentivise civil servants 
to work in the region, 
facilitate the return of 
all state services and 
administrations and the 
reintegration of 
returning refugees 
•  Install security forces in 
all communities, 
multiply patrols at the 
border and establish 
clear trade rules with 
Algeria, create a 
detention centre and a 
court of first instance in 
Kidal 
• Intensify animal 
husbandry by 
introducing 
productive breeds 
• Improve the units for 
the transformation 
and conservation of 
food (including of 
animals and cattle) 
•  Create industrial units 
and a university 
 
 
• Revise the mining code to 
take local communities’ 
concerns into account 
and closely monitor 
mining zones. Develop 
studies on HIV and on air 
and water quality 
• Diversify agriculture, 
maintain infrastructures 
• Create an observatory on 
migration, invest 
remittances in growth-
generating sectors 
• Improve youth 
employment 
• Intensify cross-border 
cooperation 
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